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The effectiveness of capital and foreign exchange controls in general, and their 
relevance for emerging markets in particular, has always been object of a high 
temperature debate. Yet, the more specific issue of the usage of ex ante selective 
restrictions on capital inflows has been served a more benign treatment, in view of 
circumstances such as capital surges, destabilizing hedge fund’s behavior, banking and 
financial crises and the regulatory innovations introduced by the worldwide adoption of 
the Basle Accord. While old style foreign exchange controls are being phased out around 
the world, adversaries of globalization increasingly align capital controls - among which 
an international “Tobin Tax” - as one crucial mechanism to sand the wheels of 
international finance. Mainstream economists and central bankers do not generally take 
proposals along these lines very seriously, most usually dismissing capital controls across 
the board with the same arguments normally thrown at price freezes and other forms of 
artificial intervention in the working of markets.  
It is true, however, that the velocity with which anti-globalization proposals to 
limit capital mobility are sidelined is not the same at which public policy has advanced in 
the topic of capital account convertibility as a general proposition, and is in no way 
proportional to the sympathy of regulators towards hedge funds. In fact, the 1997 defeat 
of the proposal to advance in this realm in the context of the Articles of Agreement of the 
IMF can be taken as an eloquent demonstration that there was less certainty in this field 
than many people thought. Indeed, an indication towards this ambiguity is the 
                                                 
1 The author wishes to thank José Maria Carvalho, Marcio Garcia and Bernardo Carvalho, as well as the 
other participants of the IASE Meeting in Rio de Janeiro for many suggestions to this note. Views herein 
are mine, under the usual caveats.   2
development of two distinct branches of empirical literature, one, positive, on the 
association of measures of capital mobility, or convertibility, and economic growth, and 
other, negative, on the association between capital mobility and currency crises; neither, 
actually, especially conclusive. Indeed, the successive episodes of instability, sudden 
stops, banking and currency crises, not to mention the growing concern with money 
laundering and terrorism’s money,  have made deregulation in the financial industry, 
especially when it involves international transactions, a very cautious process. Yet, in one 
way or the other, the debate on the regulation of foreign exchange transactions, and 
within which the scrutiny on capital flows, including inflows, has been kidnapped into the 
grand world controversy around globalization where it was torn by ideological 
misconception and prejudice. While anti-globalization groups intend to save the world 
with capital controls, mainstream economics seems unprepared to concede any role for 
capital controls, even regulatory limits to inflows, even in times of unambiguous 
exuberance.  
The question to address, in connection with Carvalho & Garcia’s (CG) paper, is 
very much circumscribed to a specific context, namely, whether there is some middle 
ground between these extremes, when one considers a brief but relevant episode of 
targeted restrictions to short term capital inflows into 1993-98 Brazil, combined with an 
aggressive liberalization of outflows, and during years in which there was little doubt that 
a “capital surge” was taken place. My personal position at the Central Bank, starting in 
October, 1993, as Deputy Governor in charge of International Affairs, and directly 
responsible for the creation and implementation of the regulatory changes in the field of 
foreign exchange regulation, through 1997, when I was elected Governor, position I held 
until early 1999, places me at a privileged position to look back at the episode from a first 
hand practitioner’s point of view, though in a somewhat uncomfortable position to judge 
“ineffectiveness”, as argued by CG. The reader should be warned of the presence of bias 
in the views expressed in what follows, which, I guess, might be a redundant advice in 
this profession. 
Some context is also very much required. In the early 1990s, Brazil was still 
enforcing old style foreign exchange controls, though with great strides towards 
liberalization. Foreign exchange shortage seemed to be the rule since the 1950s, and the   3
notion of excessive inflows, bound to deserve restrictions rather than incentives, was by 
all means novel. Indeed, in the early to mid 1990s, these were times in which the concern 
with “capital surges” and its consequences to exchange rates (and the possible threat of 
capital account induced “Dutch Disease” phenomenon) led to academic production and 
also practical experiences with various sorts of impediments to capital inflows, generally 
of an ex ante nature, deemed of a “lesser quality”, as in Calvo et al. (1993), Corbo & 
Hernandez (1996), Dooley (1995), Gavin et al. (1995) and Schadler et al. (1993)
2. More 
specifically, the experience of Chile, and also of some Asian countries, received some 
attention in the late 1980s and early 1990s while excess liquidity had been there, in some 
cases, for more than a decade, and there are mixed reviews as to the effectiveness of 
controls, however measured. Yet, as the pendulum of world liquidity retreated from 
abundance to scarcity a few years later, after the Asian, Russian and other crisis that 
followed, it was curious to see that capital account convertibility fell into disregard and 
the idea of restriction to inflows, as a way to reduce the impact of sudden stops, regained 
some popularity even where it was previously criticized. As put by Fischer (2002, pp. 12-
13):  
The IMF has cautiously supported the use of market-based capital inflow controls
3, 
Chilean style. These could be helpful for a country seeking to avoid the difficulties posed 
for domestic policy by capital inflows. The typical instance occurs when a country is trying 
to reduce inflation using an exchange rate anchor, and for anti-inflationary purposes needs 
interest rates higher than those implied by the sum of the foreign interest rate and the 
expected rate of currency depreciation. A tax on capital inflows can help maintain a wedge 
between the two interest rates. In addition, by taxing short-term capital inflows more than 
longer-term inflows, capital inflow controls can also in principle influence the composition 
of inflows. …In a nutshell: capital controls may be useful provided they are exercised with 
care; they are likely to be transitional – albeit possibly in use for a long time – and caution 
is likely to be necessary in removing them. 
 
                                                 
2 The conclusion of Calvo et al. (1993, p. 149) may offer a fair summary of the wisdom of these years: “To 
summarize, there are grounds to support a mix of policy intervention based on the imposition of a tax on 
short term capital imports, on enhancing the flexibility of exchange rates, and on raising marginal reserve 
requirements on short term bank deposits. Given the likely fiscal cost, it is hard to make a strong case in 
favor of sterilized intervention, unless countries exhibit a strong fiscal stance and capital inflows are 
expected to be short lived. In any case, we believe that none of the above policies will drastically change 
the behavior of the real exchange rate or interest rate. The choice of appropriate policies, however, could 
decidedly attenuate the detrimental effects of sudden and substantial future capital outflows.” See also 
Reinhart & Smith (1998). 
3 My italics. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that, as to the restrictions to capital inflows in 
Brazil, the Fund had mixed views and loudly ignored what was going on for quite some time. By 1997, in 
view of the commitment to the attempt to amend the Articles of Agreement towards capital account 
convertibility, there was some indication that the Fund did not like the “Brazilian style” restrictions.   4
Restrictions are never popular in this profession, nevertheless; and looking back at 
the specific Brazilian 1993-98 experience with ex ante controls imposed on inflows, even 
considering that this was combined with an aggressive deregulation on the outflow side, 
it is unfortunately not so rare, and by no means fair, to see attempts to fit these measures 
into the stereotype of bureaucrats trying to fight market fundamentals with pointless 
controls. Capital and foreign exchange controls are easy targets and mainstream 
profession would always be willing to welcome the claim of “ineffectiveness of controls” 
in general, and this was the template sought by CG to fit the 1993-98 Brazilian 
experience in particular. CG’s paper sought to supplement their econometric work with 
an attempt to penetrate the obscure realm of the trading desks, and their interaction with 
the regulator, to see what actually takes place in response to specific policy or regulatory 
measures. As a matter of fact, however, practical intricacies of Brazilian Forex legislation 
and institutions, on which this note is primarily focused, can be very confusing to 
academic researchers with incidental contact with the practitioners’ world. It is argued 
below that CG did not succeed in grasping a workable understanding of the Brazilian 
Forex legislation
4 and forming a comprehensive picture and a fair judgment of the 1993-
99 regulatory measures. More specifically, in what follows, it is argued first that the 
econometric work is seriously flawed by their key component, an “index of controls” that 
can hardly be taken as a serious and reliable summary of regulatory trends repeatedly 
described by CG with adjectives such as “complex” and even “inconsistent”. Second, one 
should not miss that CG produced accounts of “impressionistic” nature, apparently 
testimonials, of cases of alleged circumvention of controls, from zealously protected “off 
the records” market sources, with very little by means of concrete numbers, names, dates 
or any other quantitative indication of the relevance of the theoretical possibilities they 
raised. Academic standards would require somewhat more than market “hearsay”; 
questions such as “who?”, “when?”, “where?”, “how?”, “how much?” must be answered 
if these suppositions are to be seriously considered even at the journalistic terrain. In 
what follows, each of the possibilities will be reviewed as theoretical possibilities and it 
                                                 
4 One example could be CG claim that the Central Bank holds a “monopoly of  foreign exchange 
transactions”, which is very clearly not a fact, and very clearly a misinterpretation of existing legislation, or 
more specifically a confusion between the power to regulate, which belongs to the public sector, and the 
right to transact, that is given to everyone that fits regulatory requirements.   5
will be showed that they did not really exist, that when something similar was 
documented, it was not as nearly relevant as argued, or, it was such as to deserve so many 
qualifications that the conclusion would be mostly invalidated.  
Let it be clear that, in arguing along these lines, one does not intend to make a 
case for exchange controls or capital controls in general, neither a case for the 
effectiveness of restrictions to inflows as a general proposition, in times of capital surges. 
The point here is that under the particularly exuberant circumstances lived by Brazil in 
the mid 1990s, and having in mind a number of institutional features of the relevant 
market environment and associated regulation and institutions, the regulatory innovations 
for both inflows and outflows were relevant and effective given their terms of reference. 
Indeed, the relevant metric to assess “effectiveness”, as we move further the second best 
realm, where the practitioners are found, are difficult to define. Yet, more fundamentally, 
one should definitively not miss the very basic facts when one discusses measures 
designed to increase the “quality” (tenors, spreads) of capital inflows, and to tax short 
term capital inflows: how much was actually collected from the tax allegedly nobody 
paid? What happened to average tenors and spreads? Has the “quality” of inflows 
increased as envisaged? These are simple questions that go at the very heart of the issues 
being discussed and are very clearly overlooked in CG’s paper. Indeed, a look at these 
basic figures points to a conclusion opposite of CG’s, which, of course, render totally 
useless even the presumption that undocumented and yet supposedly relevant 
“circumvention” operations could have been relevant at all. 
The rest of this note is divided into three sections: the first draws attention to the 
new regulatory realities and particularly to the role of controls to banking operations in a 
world ruled by the Basle Accord within which it is quite important to have in mind the 
regulator’s discretion to interrupt any dealing that would appear unfit, the size of the 
penalties, and even criminal implications, of evading or “circumventing” the regulator’s 
directives. Section 2 provides specific clarifications on each of the “circumvention” 
possibilities, and indications on how the Central Bank acted on each situation. Section 3 
address the shortcomings of the “index of controls”, and the last section present numbers 
for the collection of taxes on capital inflows of several types and the data on the nature of 
the mainstream capital inflows into Brazil 1992-98. The amounts collected were the ones   6
expected in a world in which compliance is the rule, and the figures for inflows reveal a 
clear trend towards extended maturities in external loans, even with significantly 
decreasing spreads. The aim of restrictions, or more specifically, of the regulatory policy 
mix comprising restrictions to short term inflows and the dismantling of old style foreign 
exchange controls on outflows - the improvement in the “quality” of inflows - was fully 
accomplished.  
 
1. Controls and compliance after the Basle Accord 
As a background to more specific observations as to the alleged eleven ways to 
“circumvent” controls to inflows one should bear in mind that, notwithstanding 
undisputed “sophisticated financial markets” creativity, and the fact that capital can move 
around under countless types of disguises, foreign exchange transactions are basically 
banking transactions and, as such, subject to the scrutiny of regulators on several 
grounds. As one asks whether capital controls on inflows are possible at all, and further, 
whether selective controls on capital inflows are feasible, or even when one argues that 
such controls are effective only in the short run, what is at stake is whether the Central 
Bank is capable of looking into specific operations of banks and impose discretionary 
limitations to certain families of transactions. In fact, there is no reason to assume that 
Forex transactions are any less an object of the regulators surveillance than any other 
banking transaction. In fact, these days past the Basle Accord, most “controls” directed to 
banking activities have been internalized through compliance rules that aim at aligning 
interests of the regulator and its subjects. Internal compliance rules have been created and 
developed by all banks around the globe with the more specific objective of minimizing 
problems with the regulator in all its areas of concern, from risk weighted capital, credit 
scoring, derivatives exposure, to the precise identification of clients and the nature of 
foreign exchange operations. Indeed, the control of capital inflows can be seen as an 
activity conducted by banking supervision departments, which are perfectly capable of 
monitoring individual transactions and exercising the discretionary power to veto specific 
trades or deals as they are seen as possible violations in existing regulations, whether 
targeting risk, crime or other endeavors.    7
It is a fact that banks comply with directives of central banks as a general 
proposition, even when they restrain their activities and profit possibilities. In many cases 
banks go beyond Central Bank’s directives in order to preempt the regulator’s discretion, 
which often brings some overkill. If, for instance, the Central Bank issues guidelines 
regarding foreign exchange transactions aiming at preventing money laundering, it is 
common to see banks expanding the directive into their compliance departments in order 
to prevent any questioning that might be transformed into very costly liabilities or 
damages to the bank’s reputation. It is rare to see anyone questioning the overall 
compliance, for instance, to Basel rules regarding risk weighted capital, even though the 
by-passing may be as profitable as the by passing of capital controls. Why then one 
should assume that banks would be willing to jump at any possibility to by-pass 
regulatory directives in the subject of foreign exchange operations, in particular some 
limitations to capital inflows of certain kinds, when banks tend to be “well behaved” in 
other areas?  
Indeed, there is no literature, or bias, in the issue of alleged ineffectiveness of 
Basel rules, or banking regulation at large, as there is in the case of capital controls. 
However, as it is common to see in the regulation and in the “crime and punishment” 
literature, one may say compliance is a game involving a payoff highly dependent on not 
being caught breaking the law. Yet, in the “repeated game” between banks and their 
regulators, and in view of the importance of reputation in this business, and also for the 
normal flow of banking, one hardly see banks challenging aggressively and repeatedly 
regulatory directives, especially when the negative payoff of a controversy with the 
regulator may be very costly penalties possibly endangering the continuity of the bank. It 
is common to see controversies and discrepancies in views, during the course of the 
banking supervision activity and a wide range of activities, from credit scoring and 
associated provisioning, to foreign exchange transactions; but the instruction of the 
regulator is always the final word in practically all matters related to banking supervision. 
Why this propensity to discipline would not exist when directives are concerning controls 
to capital inflows? Why this particular subset of regulations is less effective than the rest? 
  It is true that there were times past, long ago, in which foreign exchange 
regulation was so unrealistically restrictive that one would see the development of “black   8
markets” and “curb markets”, yet not usually within the banking system, and mostly 
involving cash transactions. It is hard to imagine that controls to capital inflows would be 
such as to provoke any major dislocation towards the “black market”, or that the 
“restricted portions” of the capital account of the balance of payments could be channeled 
into transaction technologies and platforms mostly used by criminals. As a practical 
matter, it is not possible in Brazil for the “parallel market” to develop outside the 
financial systems in a dimension large enough to disturb macroeconomic policies. It is 
well known that a “black market” remains in existence in Brazil, as in any other country 
in the world, in which transactions are almost exclusively in cash and related to crime
5.  
In addition to the argument made above that banks strive to preserve a good 
working relationship with the regulator when it comes to compliance, it is also important 
to clarify the exact nature of penalties and problems related to the violations that may be 
involved in the eleven alleged circumvention operations described by CG. All the cases 
in which a foreign exchange contract in involved
6, the “circumvention” involves penalties 
defined in Article 23 of Law 4.131/62, according to which, the misrepresentation, or the 
furnishing of “false information” (paragraph 2) in foreign exchange operations contracts 
and “fraudulent misstatement” (or “false identity”) (paragraph 3) in such contracts would 
trigger penalties of up to 100% and up to 300% of the value of the contract respectively. 
In all cases, penalties are applicable not only to the seller of foreign exchange but also to 
the bank (the buyer), sometimes to their individual directors, and to the broker, if acting 
on the operation. This is an incredibly powerful directive as it makes the bank a partner to 
the sponsor of any wrongdoings associated with the foreign exchange transaction. This is 
reason enough for banks and brokers to be very selective when it comes to “creative” 
operations, or more compliance prone in this area than they normally are
7. 
                                                 
5 For a review of empirical findings on the size and scope of “black markets” around the world, with much 
consideration given to developed countries, see Galbis (1996). 
6 Technically all eleven cases should, except the “back to back” (BTB) deals described below. In these 
cases the penalties had another terms of reference – it is termed “private netting” – but are purposefully 
commensurate in value, i. e. also 100% of amounts involved. 
7 The established legal interpretation of these directives is very clear: the intention was to make banks and 
brokers co-responsible for any misrepresentation as to the nature of the operation and the identity of the 
parts. Cf. Andrade Junior (2001, pp. 259-263).    9
It is also important to note that on top of violations of foreign exchange 
regulations applied by the Central Bank, these “circumventions” also involve violations 
in tax laws, as they result in evading the tax due at the time of the foreign exchange sale 
(often the IOF, tax on financial operations, but also, sometimes, the withholding tax on 
income earned), and the attempt to disguise the liability. Penalties are implemented by 
the tax authorities and are a multiple of the tax values due and unpaid, and comparable to 
the ones applicable by the Central Bank for the violation of foreign exchange regulations 
(which are proportional to the principal amount involved) but their consequences are far 
worse as tax evasion is also a crime. Furthermore, in these transactions, in addition to tax 
evasion, there are also other crimes involved such as financial fraud and conspiracy. In 
fact, both the foreign exchange (Central Bank) and the tax (Secretaria da Receita 
Federal) authorities are obliged to inform the Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público) of 
the possible presence of crime (if not informing, these authorities may face criminal 
charges themselves). Based in such reports, Prosecutors usually do not hesitate in starting 
criminal investigations often followed by wide press coverage, on the parts involved
8. It 
is not hard to imagine the size of the damage that could do to banks and the effort of 
compliance units to prevent any occurrence that might possibly entail such course of 
events. 
In view of the above, it seems hardly likely that any significant number of banks 
would enter in any significant amounts of transactions of these types considering the risks 
of getting caught and the consequences of such conducts. Compliance units exist with the 
sole aim at avoiding conducts that might lead to confrontations with the regulator. One 
may say that hedge funds are different, but the fact is that it is impossible for a hedge 
fund, or anybody else, to conduct a foreign exchange operation without a bank. In fact, in 
every other instance, around the world, in which the regulation of hedge funds is raised, 
there always comes the point that it is through banks that regulation is exercised.  
It is true, also, that lots of anecdotal evidence may be collected on ideas or 
attempts of “by passing” regulations on capital inflows, on tax laws and foreign exchange 
regulations more generally, especially amongst traders. Within this specific group one4 
                                                 
8 For a vivid account of such procedures, from lawyer’s point of view, see Mendes (2005).   10
may say there is an agency problem that evolves as traders try to force quasi or even fully 
illegal transactions into their employers as they would earn the bonuses before the 
regulatory, tax and criminal charges and liabilities are presented later on, when traders 
have already moved on into different banks. These were the years in which Nick Leason 
was active in Singapore; some sad individual story along these lines may have taken 
place in Brazil, though with little macroeconomic relevance. The collective memory of 
trading desks in times of volatility and regulatory change must be treated with 
considerable caution as it one moves into the realm of the academic debate on the 
effectiveness, however defined, of the regulatory policy mix implemented in 1993-99 
Brazil.  
 
2. The accounts of “circumventions”  
After these general comments we turn to specific observations on the eleven 
models of transactions depicted as ways to circumvent controls or taxes on inflows of 
capital. It is useful to group the transaction according to their nature, and examine what 
took place separately. 
(i) “Disguised” FDI. 
From the onset, one should squarely disregard “cases” 1 and 2 that, in the point of 
view of the undersigned and of Central Bank officials heard on these possibilities, belong 
in the realm of fantasy. Given the documentary needs of companies with foreign 
ownership in Brazil the “disguise” is very simply impossible, and also way too risky in 
view of the sanctions mentioned above. It is true that the Central Bank saw a more 
intensive usage of inter company loans, and very specifically in 1993, but the increase in 
foreign direct investment was much larger, dissolving the impression that multinationals 
could have been using loans to undertake financial arbitrage and in excess of what would 
be normal to expect in light of their equity investments into Brazil. In any event, no case 
and no data was mentioned to support the existence of such operations. 
(ii) Portfolio investment under “Annex IV”.   11
Foreign investment into some specific fixed income instruments in Brazil, before 
December 1993, could take place through the portfolio investment foreign exchange 
“window” - “Annex IV”
9 – without any misrepresentation or risk of penalty. 
Commodities mutual funds, debentures, privatization “currency” (securitized Treasury 
bonds), and derivatives (entailing constructions such as the “box with options” deals, 
producing a synthetic of a fixed income instrument) were all permitted up to mid 1993. 
From then on, each such instruments was “withdrawn” from the list of eligible fixed 
income investments under Annex IV in a sequence and monies invested thereof had to be 
reallocated. In each case, as time was given to investors to reinvest their resources into 
different instruments, one saw a sequence of shifts of monies, in a succession, as 
resources into commodities mutual funds flew partly into debentures, then partly to “box 
with options”, until all varieties of fixed income instruments were formally forbidden. 
The fact that these restrictions were not done all at once, but in sequence, produced these 
shifts, which gave the impression of a “cat and mouse” game. The problem here was not 
circumvention but grandfathering fixed income investments made before the restrictions, 
thus avoiding complaints along the lines of “disrespect of contracts” and preserve the ex 
ante character of the restrictions
10. More essentially, however, there was little or no 
“circumvention” as resources had already been invested within the country in Real 
denominated instruments.  
At the end of 1994, all new flows into the portfolio investment window fell to 
US$ 5,0 billion, from US$ 6,5 billion in 1993
11, while the inflows into the special class of 
                                                 
9 Resolution 1,289 of the National Monetary Council regulated portfolio investment in its varied forms. The 
annexes of the Resolution had regulations for each family of investments. The most popular was Annex 
number IV regulating investments into the Brazilian stock exchange. 
10 In fact, in order to be worthy of what Stanley Fischer described as “market based” restrictions (and this 
was very important in this case as these were the first high profile restrictions to inflows in these years), a 
key aspect of the restrictions would be that their nature and cost should be fully known before the foreign 
investor decides to invest. In this connection, Brazil preferred to work with a tax paid at the moment of 
entry, with no other obligations in the future, than the Chilean system of a “quarantine”, necessarily 
involving the Central Bank receiving, managing and remunerating deposits from investors for prolonged 
periods of time 
11 Chart 1 in CG’s paper misrepresents the reality of inflows of portfolio investment into Brazil as they 
report “gross” inflows, without controlling for the accounting effects of the Brady Plan bond exchange. The 
latter produced a big statistical distortion for 1994 as the part of the Brady Plan exchange of newly issued 
bonds for existing balances within Brazil, worth approximately US$ 42 billion, implied a theoretical 
“inflow” though “Annex IV” and an “outflow” in the form of the amortization of all outstanding loans   12
fixed income funds, created for the specific purpose of removing all fixed instruments, 
even synthetics, from the portfolio investment rules,  received US$ 1,3 billion, with all 
taxes duly paid, as seen in Table 1 below. Other vehicle, “Privatization funds”, ended up 
capturing investors’ interest in privatization
12; it received US$ 1,9 billion in 1994, as also 
shown in Table 1. The fact was that, after the “grandfathering” was completed, through 
1994 and after, there was practically no claim or indication of any fixed income 
investments into “Annex IV”, except for operations known as “Blue Ship Swaps” (BCS) 
examined later and rumors that “box of options” continued to be made. CG’s claim that 
“this legislation loophole rendered the capital control completely ineffective” is 
unwarranted. There is no base, no evidence, no example or testimonial to substantiate this 
claim. Furthermore, since all deals were registered on an organized exchange, it would be 
very easy for the Central Bank and the tax authorities to revise every bank derivatives 
book, request the necessary clarifications and levy penalties discretionarily if they see fit. 
After December 1993, the conduct of “box of options” with resources under Annex IV 
would involve misrepresentation, on the part of the investor and the bank undertaking the 
Forex transaction, and would involve the violations and penalties as described above. It is 
highly unlikely that any compliance unit would authorize box deals within Annex IV, 
thus it is difficult to claim that such deal happened in any significant scale after 
December 1993. Again, not a tiny bit of evidence to that respect is offered by CG. 
   (iii) “Leads” and “lags”. 
“Case” number 3 in CG treats as “circumvention” what may at the very best be 
described as an “exception”. In Brazil, exporters are allowed to enjoy “leads”, that is, to 
anticipate export revenues through bank lines offered by local banks against the collateral 
of export receivables, and also, on a pre-shipment mode, to raise funds based on export 
commitments. Thus, local banks draw international bank lines to supply working capital 
to exporters against the credit risk of a receivable as good as the credit of the importer 
                                                                                                                                                 
being restructured. An innocent look at CG’s Chart 1 as is suggests an explosion of inflows in 1994 that did 
not happen at all.   
12 CG confuse investments through Annex IV in privatization currencies with privatization funds. These are 
very different things. The latter were created by the National Monetary Council Resolution 1806 in 1991 to 
invest in stock and debt instruments issued by companies to be privatized, later made operational by CVM 
(the Brazilian equivalent to the US Securities and Exchanges Commission) (Instrução 222/94).   13
abroad and enhanced by the local bank
13. These advances were made, and continue to be 
made at international costs, as the credit risk is prime, and indexed to the dollar. These 
are the classic “leads”, which were done in Brazil also for the pre-shipment phase of the 
export cycle. These are perfect instruments to allow exporters to arbitrate interest rate 
differentials and surely a very relevant part of the profitability of exporting from Brazil is 
related to this possibility.  
Many saw the absence or the moderation of restrictions on “leads” and “lags”, in 
the years of restrictions to short term inflows (which they indeed are) as an exception or 
as a financial “subsidy” to exporters and importers, as both were capable of undertaking 
interest rate arbitrage in ways that were forbidden to financial players more generally by 
this time. Yet, the fact that taxes to short term inflows were not enacted to affect “leads” 
and “lags” undertaken by exporters and importers did not mean that such flows were 
entirely free of restrictions. The key control variable was the maturity both for advances 
against receivables in the export side and for import financing; many changes occurred in 
these rules through these years in order to reduce the “financial gain” motivation in 
exporters and importers, which, however, true to the matter, was not that much of a 
concern to the regulator. In fact, any help into exporters’ profitability, and into the 
increase in import penetration ratios, was warmly welcome in the years in which the 
“foreign exchange anchor” was deemed crucial to end hyperinflation.  
The behavior of the arbitrageur is also worth mentioning. Anyone, not necessarily 
an exporter, could go into a Brazilian bank and draw funds from a line backed by export 
commitments (typical pre shipment advance based on receivables he did not have yet) and 
use the resources to fixed income investments. The only condition this arbitrageur had to 
obey was to actually ship exports within 180 days, just as if he was an exporter. The 
arbitrageur would have to enter what was called “the performance market”, within 
SISCOMEX (the official export registration system run by the tax authorities), where he 
could bid for the rights of a given export shipment, even if in goods different than the 
ones in which he sign his initial export shipment commitment. Exporters with a shipment 
                                                 
13 When the credit is given on a pre shipment basis, the “collateral” is an export commitment that entails 
very severe penalties if not honored. The maximum maturity of these pre shipment advances (known by the 
acronym ACC – Adiantamento de Contratos de Câmbio) has been 180 days, though it was shortened a 
couple of times. The average observed tenor, however, has been around 60 days.   14
ready, or “performance”, for which there was no previous commitment associated with a 
pre shipment financing, could sell the rights to their shipments, through the transfer of the 
title of the export registry in SISCOMEX, with a premium ranging from 1% to 5%, 
depending on a number of elements, most notably the commodities crop cycle, and surely 
also interest rate differentials
14. In these operations exporters usually capture most of the 
gain of the arbitrageur; through the years, this has been a difficult activity for financial 
players to enter, especially in view of the scarcity of bank lines for pre shipment finance. 
The exporter, most usually, the big ones and the trading companies, are the ones most 
usually trading in this market since they are the ones capable of credibly selling 
commitments to ship against which banks would advance lines at reasonable rates. It is 
difficult for a financial “middlemen”, the arbitrageur, to extract much spread from the 
owners of the export future flow.  
In view of this, it is very hard to see “circumvention” in “leads”, or loss of 
effectiveness of other restrictions to short term inflows, as suggested. The question here, 
having in mind that restrictions are to be selective, is whether it makes sense to restrict 
this specific type of inflow (“leads” more specifically
15), which is of a short term nature 
but comes to benefit of exporters in the context of an “exchange rate anchor”.  
In summary, and again, if there is a “window” here, through which financial 
arbitrageurs would be rendering restrictions to other sorts of capital inflows useless, not 
only the numbers should be shown, but the precise mechanisms to that regard be 
explained. 
 (iv) The “CC5 accounts”, Derivatives, BTBs and BCSs 
“Case” number 7, involves non resident banking accounts within Brazil (known 
as “CC5 accounts”), that enjoy full convertibility, combined with other elements. As 
regards CC5 accounts, the reader should bear in mind that since the non-resident that can 
open such an account must be a bank, and that this bank can transact on behalf of third 
                                                 
14 It must be clarified that there is no such a thing as an “underground” or “parallel” market in which these 
operations are conducted. The “performance market” exists as an interface between SISCOMEX and 
SISBACEN (the Central Banks electronic environment for forex transactions); nothing could be more 
transparently priced and regulated. 
15 As for “lags” the position was somewhat more restrictive, as some measures were implemented 
restricting the maturities of import financing loans.   15
parties, one is right in pointing out that this vehicle, in theory, represents a full fledged 
opening of the capital account. The interesting question to raise here is why this platform 
is not used more widely as there is no restriction whatsoever in the amounts and on the 
nature of the transactions made both at the inflow and at the outflow end
16. Interestingly, 
the problem here is disclosure. Any such transactions would necessarily involve the full 
identification of the parties involved and all explanations as to the nature of the 
transaction made. And, of course, at the inflow end, if the transaction is identical or even 
similar to the ones that involve an especial tax payment or any other restriction, the 
Central Bank will make sure that restrictions are obeyed and taxes paid, or simply 
instruct the bank not to do or to undo the transaction
17. The public and the regulator 
scrutiny on the movements in the CC5 accounts is very severe, given cases of fraud, 
misuse and money laundering, and for this very reason banks and individuals tend to be 
extra careful with transaction of this kind; it does not seem plausible that operations to 
circumvent restrictions to inflows were made in this channel in any significant way; it 
suffices to look at the flows, that are chronically negative. In any event, explicit taxes on 
“inflows” through CC5 accounts were enacted by mid 1995 in line with the taxation of 
fixed income mutual funds, mostly as a clarifying initiative as consultations as to there as 
an “exemption” there started to mount.  
The theoretical freedom entailed by the CC5 channel has often been raised in 
connection to constructions involving derivatives home and abroad. In the presence of 
NDFs (non deliverable forwards) traded over the counter in New York, and of futures 
(also non deliverable) in the CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange), anything is possible, 
so the theory goes, namely, a “synthetic” of a fixed income investment can be made in 
New York or in the Caribbean without anybody bothering with foreign exchange and 
banking regulations in Brazil. Yet, this is only true if some connection is established with 
the fixed income market in Brazil; if not, how the interest rate arbitrage gains could 
                                                 
16 For a review on the status of the capital account liberalization in Brazil, see Franco and Pinho Neto 
(2005). 
17 The legal framework here is somewhat more complex because it involves domestic currency based 
transactions between residents and non residents, this being why the regulatory denomination of 
transactions through CC5 accounts is “International Transfer of Reais”. The analogy with the forex 
transaction is made as one considers that an “inflow” occurred when a Real based CC5 account was 
credited.   16
possibly be collected? The same question appears time and again with the shortening of 
the Real from derivatives markets abroad: since there is no actual Reais in New York or 
Chicago to sell, all trades are “non deliverable” and they must have a connection with 
some domestic market that “delivers” in order to establish the second half of the arbitrage 
deal. 
In fact, with derivatives, or with loans, or stocks, one can indeed build what has 
been called a “back to back” (BTB) operation. “Case” number 8 is one deal in this 
family, not quite the typical one. The most common was what was called the “blue chip 
swap” (BCS) mentioned in connection with CC5 accounts, and also mentioned above as 
related to “Annex IV”. It consists of two theoretically unrelated transactions done in 
Brazil and offshore. A bank buys, for instance, Petrobras ADRs with a repo in New York, 
and the Brazilian branch of the same bank sells the same stock with a reverse repo 
agreement. The foreign “leg” of the deal was exactly the opposite of the Brazilian “leg”, 
the short and long positions in the same asset cancel out, except for the currency 
exposure, but the different financing cost at both repo and reverse repo operations is 
where the interest rate differential could be captured, if and only if the same entity could 
book the two “legs” at the same balance sheet, and other market risks are controlled for, 
and both banks in both jurisdictions have slack on their risk weighted capital. 
As these deals started to appear, or banks consulted on whether they should do it, 
many regulators, in Brazil and abroad, jumped in to understand the transaction and fit it 
into their rules. Tax authorities in Brazil grasped the “spirit” of the transaction, as it 
involved very visible fingerprints in the stock exchange, and attacked very directly all 
parties suspect of such dealings. The Central Bank, on its turn, leveraged the attack as the 
foreign exchange regulation forbids what is called “private netting”, or schemes through 
which parties “evade” a foreign exchange transaction offsetting credits and debits on 
shore and off shore. Penalties here may go up to 100% of the values transacted. 
BCS deals existed much more as legend than fact, and known deals were subject 
to very high penalties, whose values were made public to further discourage banks from   17
undertaking such risks
18. BTB deals have been heavily scrutinized because they became a 
primary model of laundering monies offshore that could not “enter” the country either in 
view of tax consideration, or worse. During the course of 2005, for instance, in a high 
profile Congressional Commission of Inquiry, it was found that the Workers Party 
appeared to have entered into several BTB transactions to use illegal campaign money 
held abroad to pay for things and bribe people within the country. This deal certainly 
belongs to the “circumvention” family described by CG: monies held offshore by PT 
could have been deposited in an offshore branch (or parallel bank) of a Brazilian bank, 
which, quid pro quo, lent money to PT in Brazil, through an intermediary, entirely out of 
market conditions, especially regarding collateral.  
Again, there is no indication on how much, when and how exactly BTBs, BCSs 
and arbitrage deals with derivatives were made. All indications are that isolated deals 
actually that took place, though small and probably involving still on going debates with 
the Central Bank and the tax authorities as to their legitimacy, as most such deals, in my 
opinion, are not truly arbitrage deals but “tax oriented” deals.  
(v) Puts and calls in foreign borrowing 
All through these years, the Central Bank established minimum tenor 
requirements for foreign borrowing that varied over time according to circumstances. On 
the tax side, the IOF (Tax on Financial Operations) was levied at rates varying from 1% 
to 9%, on the foreign exchange operation corresponding to the full principal of a given 
loan. After September 1995 the IOF rate was levied at rates depending on the maturity of 
the loan, and the withholding tax on interest of foreign loans also depended on the 
maturity of the loan. At some point, and not only in response to these rules, there were 
several cases of  “puts” and “calls” designed to “shorten” the maturity of loans taken 
abroad. All such options, however, had to be registered at the Central Bank, along with 
all other characteristics of the loan, at the moment the loan was given authorization to 
take place. Of course, in no circumstance the Central Bank authorized any loan with a 
“put” against the borrower, or a “call” from the lender, turning the maturity shorter than 
                                                 
18 Often the Central Bank implemented its penalties and informed the tax authorities which, however, 
queue the process so as to apply the penalty only at the year before the expiration of the five year 
prescription period.   18
the minimum tenor. Besides, once past the minimum tenor, if a “put” or a “call” was 
exercised, both the IOF and the withholding tax would be accelerated accordingly. This 
would not be much of penalty, but the tax collection acceleration was designed to be 
worse than to have the optioned maturity as the original one. It makes no sense to say that 
“puts” and “calls” were use to “circumvent” the minimum tenor, the IOF or the 
withholding tax; it is true that they could allow the acceleration of a loan in the case of a 
crisis, with taxes also accelerating, but always obeying the minimum tenor.  
 
Indeed, as a conclusion to this review of all theoretical possibilities of 
“circumvention”, one may admit that there are always many ways to “by pass” banking 
and foreign exchange regulations if it is to undertake fraud and run the risks associated to 
that. It is an entirely different matter to argue, and without any empirical base, that these 
possibilities turned into reality on scale large to the point of turning regulations into a 
pointless exercise. These claims are false, and as a general observation towards all 
“cases”, the reader should not miss the crucial point that there are no numbers, examples, 
or any organized evidence to provide empirical support any to claims that 
“circumvention” was the general rule in these yeas. 
 
3. The “index” of controls  
In their regressions CG employed an updated version of an “index” originally 
created by Cardoso & Goldfajn (1997) to serve as a quantitative measure of the degree of 
controls exiting for inflows and outflows of capital to/from Brazil. It is somewhat of a 
paradox that CG insist on the complexity, sometimes the inconsistency, of the Brazilian 
Forex legislation, a construction based on layers of laws and norms of different hierarchy 
through the last 60 years, and at the same time accept to describe its degree of restrictions 
by one single index that very simply associates a minus 1 to a “liberalizing” measure, and 
a positive 1, for restrictive measures. What is pointed as too complex in practice, as of a 
sudden becomes too simple as far as the econometrics goes. It seems there is a clear 
inconsistency here.    19
Some more detail on the application of this “metric” can be seen in Goldfajn & 
Minela (2005), where the reader may find that the index falls by one point, for instance, 
following a Constitutional Amendment abolishing the difference between foreign and 
domestic firms for all economic purposes (Emenda Constitucional  n. 6 of August 8
th, 
1995). Correspondingly, the index grows by one point with a Carta Circular, a legal 
instrument that publishes a decision of an individual Director of the Central Bank, 
generally confined to regulate operational aspects of a decision of the Central Bank’s 
board (whose instrument is called Circular), that, for instance, established that renewals 
of foreign loans should obey rules of the date of renewal not the ones with which the 
original loan was contracted (Carta Circular 2,444, March, 14
th, 1994). The example is 
clear enough and could be multiplied many times with many equally absurd 
“equivalences” of Laws, Decrees, Resolutions and inferior norms; it should be clear that 
to equate the impact of a change in the Constitution with far reaching consequences with 
a Carta Circular is by all means non-sense.  
Other serious distortion is to consider that every legal instrument, regardless of 
being a Law, a Resolution of the National Monetary Council, a decision of the Board of 
the Central Bank (Circular), a Presidential Decree always contain one single “measure”, 
either liberalizing, restrictive or neutral (“regulatory”). There are indeed numerous cases 
in which a given legal measure brings several changes in Forex regulations, laws or 
resolutions with dozens of dispositions, sometimes combining restrictive with liberalizing 
measures. Yet, as far as the “index” is concerned, the count is always one, positive or 
negative. This one shortcoming of the index affects very directly its “size”, and 
consequently could derail all the econometric conclusions. 
There should be no question that the lack of weighting of different “measures” – 
based on legal stature and “size” and “depth” of its content - seriously jeopardize the 
quality of the index
19.  
                                                 
19 A cursory examination of the “scores” given to the different “measures” struck me in several cases. Two 
decisions of the Board of the Central Bank (Circulares 2,242, of October 7
th, 1992 and 2677 of April 10
th, 
1996) drastically liberalizing the rules for the international transfers of Reais were given “neutral” grades. 
Another Circular changing these (n. 3,187, of April 16
th, 2003) was omitted. All of the dispositions related 
to Law 9,613, of March 3th, 1998, including Resolutions of the National Monetary Council and other 
decisions of the Central Bank’s Board, all referring to money laundering were omitted too. All would fall   20
Besides, a closer look at the “scores” given to the different “measures” appears 
striking in several cases. Two decisions of the Board of the Central Bank (Circulares 
2,242, of October 7
th, 1992 and 2677 of April 10
th, 1996), icons of the liberalization effort 
in these years, changing the rules for the international transfers of Reais, for instance, 
were given “neutral” grades. Another Circular changing these (n. 3,187, of April 16
th, 
2003) towards a more restrictive stance was omitted. All of the dispositions related to 
Law 9,613, of March 3th, 1998, including Resolutions of the National Monetary Council 
and other decisions of the Central Bank’s Board, all referring to money laundering were 
omitted too. All would fall into the “restrictive” category, all published from 1998 
onwards, prompting the index to nose up at a moment when it is going down. This is a 
very interesting case in which a major change in the nature of controls and compliance 
activity affecting the whole universe of banking transactions, and very directly forex 
operations, is simply missed by the “index”. Besides, every practitioner would admit that 
there is a growing surveillance of Public Prosecutors on the application of rforeign 
exchange regulations by the Central Bank since 1999, from which one could see a 
“tightening” of overall restrictions, yet very clearly oriented to the issue of tax evasion 
and money laundering. Some observers described that trend as a “recycling” of foreign 
exchange controls, now based on banking supervision and compliance units and with 
motivations very clearly different from those of the 1960s
20. Nothing of this is captured 
by the “index”, which, to the very extent it is missing a big piece of the action, is failing 
the purpose for which it was invented. Therefore, CG claim that, all this notwithstanding, 
the index “rightly capture the major trends”, is totally unwarranted, and a very cheap 
price to pay in order to produce raw material to run regressions. The reader should bear in 
mind that the quality of the econometric result is capped by the one of the data that, in 
this case, would require a lot of work to became useful.   
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
into the “restrictive” category, from 1998 onwards, biasing the index. One gets the impression that there 
was some form of selective choice of “measures” to compose the index.  
20 See Franco and Pinho Neto (2005) for an extended discussion of this topic.   21
4. IOF collection and the nature of inflows 
Lastly, some interesting pieces of evidence could be offered to provide some 
comfort to Brazilian taxpayers, understandably concerned about CG allegations. As one 
of the most important restrictions to inflows subject to the accusation of ineffectiveness, 
given alleged “circumvention” possibilities, is the IOF, the financial transactions tax due 
after the liquidation of certain foreign exchange transactions, I searched my archives to 
find the documents used at the time by the Central Bank to indicate the amounts to be 
collected by the tax authorities. Table 1 offers the estimates of the Central Bank of the 
amounts collected in the several varieties of incidence of the IOF tax through time. Even 
though these amounts are not the ones reported by tax authorities based on actual 
collection
21, there is no reason to doubt that these amounts were actually paid as the 
Central Bank works technically as a “substitute” to the tax authority requesting the proof 
of tax payment in order to confirm the registration of foreign capital along the lines of 
existing legislation, and to authorize any remittances such as interest and repatriation.  
                                                 
21 Which, by the way, are not published with this level of detail.   22
Table 1 
Some forms of capital inflows into Brazil, IOF tax rates (1) and estimates of amounts 
collected (2), December 1993 to June 1996 (monthly flows, US$ Million)  
   Fixed income funds  Privatization funds  Borrowing abroad - all formats (3) (4) (5) 
period  inflows  rate  $   inflows  rate  $  Inflows  agro  taxable  Rate   $ 
Dec-93 80  5,0%  4  0  0,0%  0  1.714  0  1.714  3,0%  51 
                            
January-94 82 5,0%  4  0  0,0%  0  745 0  719 3,0%  22 
February-94 82  5,0%  4 0  0,0%  0  770  0  563  3,0%  23 
March-94 102  5,0%  5  6 0,0%  0  714  0  710  3,0%  21 
April-94 119  5,0%  6  137  0,0%  0  932  0  498  3,0%  28 
May-94 68  5,0%  3  232  0,0%  0  283  0  256  3,0%  8 
June-94 450  5,0%  23  266  0,0%  0  304  0  241  3,0%  9 
July-94 6  5,0%  0  54  0,0%  0  351  0  348  3,0%  11 
August-94 81  5,0%  4  87 0,0%  0  349  0 348  3,0%  10 
September-94 216  9,0%  19  60  0,0%  0  540  0  529  3,0%  16 
October-94 226  9,0%  20  846 0,0%  0  925 0  824 3,0%  28 
November-94 0  9,0%  0  174  0,0% 0  1.404 0  1.370 7,0%  96 
December-94 2  9,0%  0  77  0,0% 0  1.459 0  1.300 7,0%  102 
1994 - total  1.434     89  1.939        8.776  0  7.706     374 
January-95 0  9,0%  0  16  0,0%  0  401 0  200 7,0%  28 
February-95 0  9,0%  0 79  0,0%  0  193  0  193  7,0%  14 
March-95 0  5,0%  0  128  0,0%  0  103  0  79  7,0%  7 
April-95 1  5,0%  0  67  0,0%  0  650  0  635  0,0%  0 
May-95 64  5,0%  3  95  0,0%  0  858  0  850  0,0%  0 
June-95 1  5,0%  0  120  0,0%  0  2.839  5  1.804  0,0%  0 
July-95 91  5,0%  5  164  0,0%  0  2.383  85  1.497  0,0%  0 
August-95 41  5,0%  2  484  0,0%  0  2.318  98  1.832  0,0%  0 
September-95 0  7,0%  0  62  0,0%  0  1.121  383  688  2,7%  31 
October-95 0  7,0%  0  170 0,0%  0  1.786  112  1.549  2,2%  39 
November-95 12  7,0%  1  219  0,0% 0  1.275 187  996  2,9%  37 
December-95 1  7,0%  0  351  0,0% 0  1.768 189  1.481 2,5%  45 
1995 - total  211     11  1.955     0  15.695  1.059  11.804     201 
January-96 2  7,0%  0  2  0,0%  0  1.359  112  949 2,7%  37 
February-96 4  7,0%  0 4  5,0%  0  1.677  203  1.392  3,3%  56 
March-96 2  7,0%  0  2 5,0%  0  1.467  258  876  2,1%  30 
April-96 3  7,0%  0  3  5,0%  0  1.670  499  1.107  2,1%  35 
May-96 0  7,0%  0  0  5,0%  0  2.717  397  2.228  1,2%  33 
June-96 0  7,0%  0  0  5,0%  0  3.343  585  2.090  1,7%  58 
1996 - total  11     1  11     0  12.233  2.054  8.642     249 
                          
GRAND 
TOTAL  1.736      105 3.905      0 38.418 3.113 29.866     875 
Notes: (1) Legal instruments: Decree 995, Nov. 25, 1993, 3% IOF on Fixed Income Funds and 3% on foreign 
borrowing generally defined. Finance Minister Directive (“Portaria”) n. 534, October 19, 1994, 9% IOF on Fixed 
Income Funds, 7% on foreign borrowing and 1% on inflows of portfolio investments (stock exchange); Portaria n. 95, 
March 9, 1995, 5% IOF on Fixed Income Funds, zero for all other inflows; Portaria n. 202, August 10, 1995, 7% IOF 
on Fixed Income Funds, 5% on foreign borrowing  and 7% on CC5 accounts inflows, and zero for portfolio 
investments (stock exchange); Portaria n. 205, August 15, 1995, zero for loans directed to agriculture; Portaria n. 228, 
September 15, 1995, 5% on foreign borrowing  with tenors up to 2 years, 4% for those up to 3 years, 2% for those up to   23
4 years, 1% for loans up to 5 years and zero if longer;  Portaria n. 28, February 8, 1996, adds a 5% IOF on inflows to 
Privatization Funds; Portaria n. 149, June 11, 1996, exempts BNDES. (2) Values for taxes due listed according to the 
date of the inflow, not the date of payment. (3) There are other “non taxable” forms of borrowing not included in the 
table, such as import financing, leasing contracts and flows from multilateral agencies. (4) After September 1995 rates 
are averages, as they depended on the maturity of each loan. (5) taxes due might be larger than taxable inflow 
multiplied by the rate given taxation, not reported in the table, of similar transaction made through CC5 accounts. 
SOURCE: Banco Central do Brasil, Personal Archive. 
 
Table 1 provides a history of the IOF usage for that purpose as it covers all 
changes occurring between November of 1993 - when the first presidential decree was 
issued creating the possibility of taxing certain foreign exchange transactions at certain 
rates, and delegating to the Finance Minister limited powers to change the tax rate - until 
the month of June of 1996. This specific cutoff date is arbitrary; the active use of the IOF 
continued more or less unchanged at a restrictive stance until the Asian crisis when most 
restrictions were removed and tax rates changed to zero. Early in 1998, however, after 
what was seen as a very successful response to the Asian crisis – a combination of a 
fiscal package with monetary tightening – capital inflows regained momentum very 
rapidly, international reserves reached their all time high, and, as a consequence, 
administrative restrictions to inflows were reinstated and the IOF tax on certain types of 
inflows was reestablished very quickly. A few months later, with the Russian & LTCM 
crisis, such restrictions were removed, and were not to be seen again
22. Table 1 does not 
cover the whole period in which the IOF and other restrictions to inflows were deployed 
– November 1993 to mid 1998 – but its coverage and numbers provide important 
indications as to the impacts of the IOF on capital inflows. 
During the period covered by Table 1 the total amount collected was slightly over 
a billion dollars, including what is reported in the table and, in addition: (i) the revenues 
produced by the IOF on inflows directed to the stock exchange, which were taxed with a 
rate of 1% between November of 1994 and March 1995, with estimated revenues of US$ 
88 million; and (ii) the revenues produced by the 7% IOF on CC5 based inflows in force 
from September 1995 to the last month covered by the table, with total revenues of US$ 
24 million.  
                                                 
22 The pro-cyclical character of restrictions to capital inflows should be seen as an obvious thing, at least in 
the minds of those, amongst whom I am included, who created and managed these instruments through 
time: for what other possible reason would the authorities possibly introduce such restrictions? Yet, for 
those interested in econometric technique to set proof of first hand accounts of declared intentions, as it is 
common in the cliometrics literature, please refer to Cardoso & Goldfajn (1997).   24
Table 1 shows that the Fixed Income Funds lost their popularity after the 9% IOF 
tax, the same happening to Privatization Funds after the 5% IOF tax early in 1996. In any 
event, given the amounts collected and the ready influence of the IOF rate changes into 
the targeted inflows, it is hard to argue that IOF evasion was very relevant. It is also 
important to note that the largest part of the taxable inflows was in the foreign borrowing 
column; it was on this region that most of the Central Bank’s action – through the IOF, 
minimum tenors and other restrictions
23 – was conducted.  
Table 2 below, with basic data on loans abroad for 1992-99, helps completing the 
picture of the impact of restrictions to capital inflows into Brazil during these years. 
                                                 
23 Other restrictions were mostly sectoral, as, for instance, in the case of  public sector entities, for which 
the stance was increasingly restrictive for fiscal reasons. For agricultural loans, the treatment was favorable 
at times, neutral oftentimes.   25
Table 2 
Foreign borrowing from Brazilian residents, registered loans: number of issues, volume, 
average maturity, spreads and costs, from1992-I to 1999-I (quarterly flows, US$ Million)  
 
 
SOURCE: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil, Personal Archive. 
 
The numbers in Table 2 cover the largest part of the capital account, so that if 
there is any field of play as regards the impact of restrictions, whether taxes or minimum 
tenors, it is here. The period covered starts when the concern with “excessive” capital 
inflows started and goes up to the first quarter of 1999, way past the Russian and LTCM 
crises. It is very clearly visible that the number of issues and volumes grew constantly, 
with some seasonal variation and also with declines entirely within what would be 
expected in mid 1994 (critical months of the Real Plan), early 1995 (Tequilla Crisis, very 
short lived) and 1997-IV (the Asian crisis). The impact of the Russian & LTCM crisis is 
way much larger than all the other crises, as we all know.   26
The one interesting aspect of this table in connection to the topic of this note 
refers to the average maturity and the spreads. The trend towards and lower spreads only 
highlights the importance of the fact that tenors are extended more or less constantly 
through time, from around three years in 1992 to around ten years right before the 
Russian crisis. One should note that IOF taxes pictured in Table 1 combines with direct 
impositions as to minimum tenors, for instance, in order to affect the outcomes reported 
in Table 2. There seems to be no doubt that, as one looks into the evolution of these flows 
that the “quality” (tenors and spreads) improved through time, just as aimed by the 
regulatory restrictions, whether tax or administrative. As argued in the beginning of this 
note, these are the basic facts that one should come to terms before launching the 
“ineffectiveness” claim.  In order to argue that regulatory policies towards improving the 
quality of capital inflows failed, one has to seek alternative explanations for the 
developments shown in Table 2, which seems to suggest just the opposite. The course of 
economic reforms and the success of the Real Plan are surely very relevant explanations 
to the improved access to international capital markets, the reduction in sovereign risk 
and the extension of maturities, but most likely with a little help from regulatory 
restrictions to short term inflows. Indeed, restrictions may very well be effective if they 
go the same direction of “fundamentals” as in the case in point.   27
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